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ABSTRACT 
            Passive Optical Network (PON) is a promising solution to the last-mile 
problem in access networks. Security is a very crucial aspect to be considered 
especially in the current environments that are characterized by much larger data 
transport capacity. Moreover, securing the physical layer requires urgent attention as 
it will become more critical in future PON that has much longer distance with the 
involvement of more users. Thus, it is vulnerable to a variety of attacks, including 
denial of service (DoS) which jams a network, eavesdropping and masquerade. DoS 
attack can take place when a continuous upstream signal is transmitted from Optical 
Network Unit (ONU) to Optical Line Terminal (OLT) with high enough power, 
causing the OLT to receive the data with high bit error rate. This research proposes a 
method to secure PON from high power injection attack. The solution is based on the 
idea of deploying an optical attenuator in the upstream communication towards the 
splitter to prevent any high signal power injection attack and restrict it up to an 
acceptable power level. One of the most important benefits of the proposed work is 
its straightforward implementation in the existing GPON network with minimum 
cost and effort. The GPON network under studied that focuses on the upstream 
communication based on standard ITU-T G.984 ( data rate of 1.25 Gbps) examined 
the effects of varied optical fiber distances and number of ONUs. The performance 
of the proposed method is evaluated using Optisystem to determine the feasibility of 
the concept. Findings from the simulation results revealed that the optical attenuator 
compensated the jamming degradation attack up to eight ONUs and maximum 
distance of 20 km. The proposed system design also found that the method has 
limitation to reduce the attack at higher ONU numbers e.g. 16 and 32 due to high 
insertion loss. The overall performance confirms that this method is useful to protect 
the GPON system and minimize the high power for low insertion loss power splitter. 
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  ABSTRAK 
            Rangkaian Optik Pasif (PON) merupakan penyelesaian berpotensi kepada 
masalah batu-terakhir dalam rangkaian akses. Keselamatan adalah aspek yang sangat 
penting untuk dipertimbangkan terutamanya dalam persekitaran semasa yang 
dicirikan oleh kapasiti pengangkutan data yang lebih besar. Lebih-lebih lagi, lapisan 
fizikal yang memerlukan perhatian segera kerana ia akan menjadi lebih kritikal pada 
PON masa hadapan yang melibatkan jarak lebih jauh dan lebih ramai pengguna. 
Oleh itu, ia terdedah kepada pelbagai serangan, termasuk penafian perkhidmatan 
(DoS) yang meresapi rangkaian, pengintipan dan penyamaran. Serangan DoS boleh 
berlaku apabila isyarat hulu berterusan dihantar dari Unit Rangkaian Optik (ONU) ke 
Terminal Talian Optik (OLT) dengan kuasa yang cukup tinggi, menyebabkan OLT 
menerima data dengan kadar ralat bit yang tinggi. Penyelidikan ini mencadangkan 
kaedah untuk menjamin PON daripada serangan suntikan kuasa tinggi. Penyelesaian 
ini adalah berdasarkan idea yang menggerakkan pelemah optik dalam komunikasi 
huluan ke arah pembahagi untuk mengelakkan sebarang serangan suntikan kuasa 
isyarat tinggi dan menyekatnya ke tahap kuasa yang boleh diterima. Salah satu 
faedah yang paling penting dalam penyelesaian yang dicadangkan adalah 
pelaksanaannya yang jelas dalam rangkaian GPON yang sedia ada dengan kos dan 
usaha yang minimum. Rangkaian GPON yang dipelajari memberi tumpuan kepada 
komunikasi hulu berdasarkan standard ITU-T G.984 (kadar data 1.25 Gbps) dengan 
mengambilkira kesan pelbagai jarak gentian optik dan bilangan ONUs. Prestasi 
kaedah yang dicadangkan dinilai dengan menggunakan Optisystem untuk menguji 
perlaksanaan konsep tersebut. Penemuan dari keputusan simulasi menunjukkan 
bahawa penguat optik mampu untuk menghadapi serangan kemerosotan signal 
kualiti sehingga lapan ONUs dan jarak maksimum 20 km. Reka bentuk sistem yang 
dicadangkan juga mendapati bahawa kaedah yang dicadangkan mempunyai had 
untuk mengurangkan serangan bagi nombor ONU yang lebih tinggi, misalnya 16 dan 
32 kerana kehilangan kuasa pembahagi kuasa yang tinggi. Prestasi keseluruhan 
mengesahkan bahawa kaedah ini berguna untuk melindungi sistem GPON dan 
meminimumkan serangan tinggi kuasa untuk kes kehilangan kuasa pembahagi yang 
rendah. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
          Nowadays, most high-speed optical access network operate base on in 
Passive Optical Network (PON) technology which is a promising solution to the last-
mile problem in the access networks as shown below in Figure 1.1. The optical fiber 
network offers a higher capacity to the subscribers compared to other access 
technologies such as coaxial, copper or hybrid fiber-coaxial (HFC). PONs are widely 
implemented due to the absence of the active devices in Optical Distribution 
Network (ODN). The subscribers use device called Optical Network Units (ONUs). 
Meanwhile, another device called Optical Line Termination (OLT) is located in the 
central office and is operated by service provider. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Scenarios of XG-PON1 with GPON [1] 
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Similar to other access network technologies, security is a very crucial aspect 
to be considered especially in the modern communication networks that are 
distinguished by large amount of data and high speeds. Moreover, securing the 
physical layer issues need urgent attention as it will become more critical in future 
PON that has much longer distance with the involvement of more users. One of the 
critical issues is the ONU users can intercept the data that sent to other ONUs due to 
the broadcasting mechanism in Time Division Multiplexing – Gigabit Passive 
Optical Network (TDM-GPON) as shown in Figure 1.2. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Broadcasting mechanisms in TDM-GPON [2] 
 
Furthermore, in the current PON implementation, security requirements such 
as authentication and encryption are optional and, in the downstream communication 
from OLT to ONU, the secret encryption key is sent as sent as plain texts according 
to the ITU-T G.984 standard [3]. Meanwhile, the upstream communication link from 
ONU to OLT is not encrypted, and it is vulnerable to a variety of attacks, including 
denial of service (DoS) which jams a network, eavesdropping and masquerade that is 
also known as reply attack. Moreover, DoS attack can take place when a 
continuously transmitting upstream signal with high enough power at an Optical 
Network Unit (ONU) is injected to block all other ONUs from getting their data as 
illustrated in Figure 1.3 [4]. Furthermore, the attacker can exploit any reflection 
signal from the ODN splitter to eavesdrop the data of victim ONU [5]. Therefore, 
malicious in the upstream channel is difficult to identify due to passive nature 
elements in the optical network. 
 3 
 
Figure 1.3 Scenario denial of service attack [4] 
 
Based on the fact, this research aims to investigate the security issues and 
weaknesses in PON and to enhance the network security by deploying a passive 
device called optical attenuator in the upstream directions towards the splitter that 
thwart high power signal attack. By using a passive optical attenuator, the injection 
of higher power signal can be restricted up to an acceptable power level without any 
denial of service (DoS). The vest of this chapter describes the overview of the 
problem statements, objectives, the scope of work, work schedule and thesis outline. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Passive optical networks come up with the standard security for data 
encryption, authentication, and key establishment. In the physical layer of the GPON, 
the upstream transitions from ONU to OLT are vulnerable to several attacks, 
including denial of service (DoS) which jams a network and prevent communication 
in a specific link. Therefore, Dos happens when an attacker injects a continuously 
signal with high power at a particular wavelength into the fiber to prevent other 
ONUs from getting their data and degrading the service. It is more serious for in-
band jamming attack which occurs when the jamming wavelength is similar to the 
legitimate frequency. However, an out-of-band jamming attack can also degrade the 
quality or even denial the service of legitimate signal due to injection of high power 
4 
wavelength that had a different frequency from the legitimate signal and cause the 
denial of service due to the inter crosstalk and adjacent channels. Therefore, both 
attacks can jam the network and degrade the performance of the signal.   
1.3 Objectives 
The objectives of this research are:  
1- To investigate the security issues and weaknesses in the physical layer of 
the GPON. 
2- To simulate the deployment of a passive optical attenuator in the GPON 
in an upstream direction towards the splitter to prevent any high power 
signal injection attack. 
3- To evaluate the feasibility and transmission performance of the proposed 
design. 
 
1.4 Scope of Work 
The scope of this research concentrates on three parts: 
1. Simulation: 
- The design and simulation of the GPON system based on TDM.  
- The simulation tool that used to achieve the objectives is optisystem 
software. 
2. System Parameters: 
 
-  ONU transmitted power range 0-5 dBm. 
-  Upstream wavelength 1310nm with the data rate 1.25 Gbps. 
- Continuous wave attacker signal. 
- Distance: 1 km, 10 km, 20 km, and 30 km. 
- Receiver sensitivity -28 dBm. 
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3. Result Analysis: 
- Evaluate correctness of GPON operation and evaluate the feasibility of an 
optical attenuator. 
- Assess signal quality through BER and Q-factor. 
 
1.5 Research Methodology  
1.5.1 Work Schedule 
-  Research planning and schedule (Gantt chart) 
 
Table 1.1 Project Schedule 
 
1.6 Thesis Outlines 
The project report comprises five chapters which describe the overall project 
progress and implementation. Each section discusses the different topics related to 
this project. 
Chapter 1 briefly introduces an overview of this project, problem statement, 
objectives, the scope of work, research methodology and report outlines. 
Chapter 2 discusses the literature review on the study of this project. It will include 
the GPON architecture. Besides that, it introduces the various types of attack, threats, 
and weakness in GPON. Lastly, review of the previous work which relates to this 
project is provided. 
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Chapter 3 focuses on the methodology used throughout this project and presents the 
design and simulation based on OTDM- GPON architecture for different models. 
The simulation tool that will be used to achieve the objectives is Optisystem 
software. 
Chapter 4 discusses the evaluation and the results of the proposed system’s security 
and transmission performances parameters for other models. The performance 
parameter involves Eye diagram, Q factor, and BER and power budget. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the conclusion of the whole project and recommendations for 
future development are given to enhance the security in PON. 
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